Technical facts placed next to the questions legal rules ask. Not legal advice and not a legal determination.

How to read it: Each check states what was observed and which rule it relates to. The rule texts are open to inspect.

Words used here:

Regulatory relevance

Automated technical checks · Not a legal determination

These checks describe one scan: Chrome (Chromium) 153.0.8010.12, linux, egress region tr-workstation, method NR-v0.3.0, rule pack NR-LEGAL-2026.10.0. Other browsers, regions and dates can differ.

Technical observations, not legal advice
Rule set NR-LEGAL-2026.10.0: technical observations mapped to published rules; not legal advice and not a legal determination. The rule texts and state conditions below are published so they can be inspected. A state is a rule reference for an observation, not a finding about the platform.

Checks by state

How many checks fall in each state, for all jurisdictions and for each one. A state describes what the scan observed and nothing more.

  • Relevant signal observed3
  • Potential concern1
  • Inconclusive0
  • Not observed1
  • Not assessed0

The five states, and why Radar reports no verdict

Relevant signal observed
The technical facts the rule asks about were observed in the measured runs. Whether they matter legally is a separate question.
Potential concern
The observed facts may call for a closer legal assessment. This is not a determination.
Inconclusive
The scan could not establish the facts the rule needs, for example because a consent interaction did not succeed.
Not observed
The technical facts the rule asks about were not observed in the measured runs.
Not assessed
The runs the rule needs were missing or not valid, so the rule was not evaluated.

Radar reports what a scan observed in one browser, region and method, and which legal question that observation may be relevant to. Whether a legal requirement is met depends on facts a browser scan cannot see, such as purpose, lawful basis, exemptions and contracts. For that reason Radar does not grade, score or give a verdict on a legal question, and a state is never a statement about what the site operator did or intended.

Checks by jurisdiction

Choose a jurisdiction to see every check recorded for it in this scan, with its observation, legal mapping, evidence and computed facts.

  • Relevant signal observed2
  • Potential concern1
  • Inconclusive0
  • Not observed0
  • Not assessed0
  • Relevant signal observed

    Evidence: 100

    Access to terminal-equipment information before a consent choice

    Directive 2002/58/EC (ePrivacy Directive), as amended by Directive 2009/136/ECArticle 5(3)Rule version 1.0.0

    Observation
    Before any consent action (valid before-choice runs: 3; highest value in any run): signal families 13; instrumented API events 23910; fingerprint-like behaviors 9; data-flow-linked transmissions 0; correlated-only transmissions 13; third-party destinations 1.

    Technical question Did page scripts read browser or device information through instrumented APIs, or send or store values derived from it, before any consent choice in the measured environment?

    Legal mapping

    ePrivacy Directive Art. 5(3) - technical-scope analysis may be required (EDPB Guidelines 2/2023).

    Article 5(3)European Data Protection Board (EDPB) (opens in a new tab)

    Runs this rule reads

    • Before choice3 of 3 valid Before choice runs
    • Reject all3 of 3 valid Reject all runs
    • Accept all3 of 3 valid Accept all runs
    Not established by this scan
    • Whether an exemption applies (for example technical storage or access that is strictly necessary for the provider of an information society service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user to provide that service)
    • Controller purpose or lawful basis
    • Whether each observation constitutes legally relevant access to, or storage of, information in terminal equipment within the technical scope of Art. 5(3)
    • Whether the site operator, a third party, or both determine the purpose of the observed script behavior

    Rationale and limitations

    Rationale

    Instrumented browser or device APIs were accessed before any consent action. Whether this access falls within Art. 5(3) depends on legal predicates that this scan does not establish.

    Limitations

    • Automated technical check: it reports observations that may be relevant to a legal question and does not decide that question.
    • Measured in Chrome (Chromium) 153.0.8010.12 (headless, linux) from egress region tr-workstation; one entry URL, fresh profile, no sign-in. Other browsers, regions, devices and visitor states may differ.
    • Fixed observation window of 10 s after load; activity outside the window, and on other pages of the site, is not observed.
    • Instrumentation runs in an automated browser; APIs that are not hooked are not recorded, and pages may behave differently for automated browsers.
    • Counts are the highest value observed in any single valid run of the scenario; repeated runs of the same scenario can differ.
    • Instrumented API access shows that a call happened. It does not by itself show fingerprinting, the identification of a person, or a purpose.
    • Data-flow links match values returned by browser APIs, or digests of them, to outgoing payloads; matching can miss encodings and short values can match by coincidence.
    • Consent interface detection and control selection are automated (CMP adapters and heuristics); banners can be missed, delayed or region-specific, and the control chosen as most comprehensive may differ from what a visitor sees.

    Computed facts (9)

    These are the exact values the rule conditions read for this scan, so the state can be reproduced from them. Counts are the highest value seen in any single valid run.

    Computed facts for Access to terminal-equipment information before a consent choice
    FactComputed value
    Before choice: api eventsbefore.api_events23,910
    Before choice: behaviorsbefore.behaviors9
    Before choice: correlated linksbefore.correlated_links13
    Before choice: signal familiesbefore.signal_families13
    Before choice: third party destinationsbefore.third_party_destinations1
    Before choice: valid runsbefore.valid_runs3
    Before choice: verified linksbefore.verified_links0
    Consent interface: action failedconsent.action_failedno
    Consent interface: banner ambiguousconsent.banner_ambiguousno
  • Relevant signal observed

    Evidence: 100

    Access to terminal-equipment information after a Reject all action

    Directive 2002/58/EC (ePrivacy Directive), as amended by Directive 2009/136/ECArticle 5(3)Rule version 1.0.0

    Observation
    After the Reject all action (valid Reject all runs: 3; post-choice window, highest value in any run): signal families 8; instrumented API events 10589; fingerprint-like behaviors 1; data-flow-linked transmissions 0; third-party destinations 0. Consent interface reappeared after the action: no.

    Technical question After the most comprehensive reject control of the consent interface was used, did page scripts still read browser or device information through instrumented APIs, or send values derived from it?

    Legal mapping

    ePrivacy Directive Art. 5(3) - technical-scope analysis may be required for activity observed after a reject action (EDPB Guidelines 2/2023).

    Article 5(3)European Data Protection Board (EDPB) (opens in a new tab)

    Runs this rule reads

    • Before choice3 of 3 valid Before choice runs
    • Reject all3 of 3 valid Reject all runs
    • Accept all3 of 3 valid Accept all runs
    Not established by this scan
    • Whether the reject control covered the purposes of the observed access
    • Whether an exemption applies (for example technical storage or access that is strictly necessary for the provider of an information society service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user to provide that service)
    • Controller purpose or lawful basis
    • Whether each observation constitutes legally relevant access to, or storage of, information in terminal equipment within the technical scope of Art. 5(3)

    Rationale and limitations

    Rationale

    Instrumented browser or device APIs were accessed after the Reject all action settled. Whether the access falls within Art. 5(3), and whether an exemption or another basis applies, is not established by this scan.

    Limitations

    • Automated technical check: it reports observations that may be relevant to a legal question and does not decide that question.
    • Measured in Chrome (Chromium) 153.0.8010.12 (headless, linux) from egress region tr-workstation; one entry URL, fresh profile, no sign-in. Other browsers, regions, devices and visitor states may differ.
    • Fixed observation window of 10 s after load; activity outside the window, and on other pages of the site, is not observed.
    • Instrumentation runs in an automated browser; APIs that are not hooked are not recorded, and pages may behave differently for automated browsers.
    • Counts are the highest value observed in any single valid run of the scenario; repeated runs of the same scenario can differ.
    • Instrumented API access shows that a call happened. It does not by itself show fingerprinting, the identification of a person, or a purpose.
    • Data-flow links match values returned by browser APIs, or digests of them, to outgoing payloads; matching can miss encodings and short values can match by coincidence.
    • Consent interface detection and control selection are automated (CMP adapters and heuristics); banners can be missed, delayed or region-specific, and the control chosen as most comprehensive may differ from what a visitor sees.

    Computed facts (9)

    These are the exact values the rule conditions read for this scan, so the state can be reproduced from them. Counts are the highest value seen in any single valid run.

    Computed facts for Access to terminal-equipment information after a Reject all action
    FactComputed value
    Consent interface: action failedconsent.action_failedno
    Consent interface: banner ambiguousconsent.banner_ambiguousno
    Consent interface: banner reappearedconsent.banner_reappearedno
    Reject all: api eventsreject.api_events10,589
    Reject all: behaviorsreject.behaviors1
    Reject all: signal familiesreject.signal_families8
    Reject all: third party destinationsreject.third_party_destinations0
    Reject all: valid runsreject.valid_runs3
    Reject all: verified linksreject.verified_links0
  • Potential concern

    Evidence: 9

    Identifier-like storage written before a consent choice

    Directive 2002/58/EC (ePrivacy Directive), as amended by Directive 2009/136/ECArticle 5(3)Rule version 1.0.0

    Observation
    Before any consent action (valid before-choice runs: 3; highest value in any run): distinct cookies set 3 (third-party: 0); identifier-like persistent storage writes 1.

    Technical question Were cookies, or persistent web-storage entries with identifier-like values, written to the browser before any consent choice in the measured environment?

    Legal mapping

    ePrivacy Directive Art. 5(3) - technical-scope analysis may be required for information stored in terminal equipment (EDPB Guidelines 2/2023); exemptions are not assessed.

    Article 5(3)European Data Protection Board (EDPB) (opens in a new tab)

    Runs this rule reads

    • Before choice3 of 3 valid Before choice runs
    • Reject all3 of 3 valid Reject all runs
    • Accept all3 of 3 valid Accept all runs
    Not established by this scan
    • Whether an exemption applies (for example technical storage that is strictly necessary for the provider of an information society service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user to provide that service)
    • Whether a stored value identifies a person or a device
    • Controller purpose or lawful basis
    • Whether the storage was set by the site operator or by a third party, and which of them determines its purpose

    Rationale and limitations

    Rationale

    A persistent cookie or localStorage entry with an identifier-like value (hex, base64 or UUID class, 16 or more characters) was written before any consent action. Whether it is strictly necessary, or identifies a person or device, is not established; technical-scope analysis may be required.

    Limitations

    • Automated technical check: it reports observations that may be relevant to a legal question and does not decide that question.
    • Measured in Chrome (Chromium) 153.0.8010.12 (headless, linux) from egress region tr-workstation; one entry URL, fresh profile, no sign-in. Other browsers, regions, devices and visitor states may differ.
    • Fixed observation window of 10 s after load; activity outside the window, and on other pages of the site, is not observed.
    • Instrumentation runs in an automated browser; APIs that are not hooked are not recorded, and pages may behave differently for automated browsers.
    • Counts are the highest value observed in any single valid run of the scenario; repeated runs of the same scenario can differ.
    • Storage events are counted per distinct cookie or storage key; whether a stored value is strictly necessary is not assessed.
    • Identifier-like means a persistent cookie or localStorage entry with a random-looking value (hex, base64 or UUID class, 16 or more characters); this is a heuristic and does not show that the value identifies a person or device.
    • Consent interface detection and control selection are automated (CMP adapters and heuristics); banners can be missed, delayed or region-specific, and the control chosen as most comprehensive may differ from what a visitor sees.

    Computed facts (6)

    These are the exact values the rule conditions read for this scan, so the state can be reproduced from them. Counts are the highest value seen in any single valid run.

    Computed facts for Identifier-like storage written before a consent choice
    FactComputed value
    Before choice: cookies setbefore.cookies_set3
    Before choice: identifier storage writesbefore.identifier_storage_writes1
    Before choice: third party cookies setbefore.third_party_cookies_set0
    Before choice: valid runsbefore.valid_runs3
    Consent interface: action failedconsent.action_failedno
    Consent interface: banner ambiguousconsent.banner_ambiguousno

Provenance

Evidence record

Which versions produced this scan, the digest of its manifest, and the public evidence file of every run.

Scan
NR-SC-01M78Z5AJYGGGCT488SE7AQK3N
Manifest SHA-256
3a4a27264b52cc43935ed4d1edda965a9ec73a5a8dedd1d2ed747bd1a5890abe
Method version
NR-v0.3.0
Probe version
radar-probe@0.2.0
Classifier version
NR-CLS-0.2.0
Rule pack version
NR-LEGAL-2026.10.0
Redaction policy
NR-REDACT-2
Runs
12
Public evidence files of this scan, one per run
ScenarioRunEvidence explorerPublic file
Before choiceNR-RN-01M78Z5ARQ2P86S0AW6AP8JJ5QOpen the recordsJSON
Before choiceNR-RN-01M78Z7TVTT8NMA8TW1ZFDGDHGOpen the recordsJSON
Before choiceNR-RN-01M78Z9QG8Y7JEDJ9404N60ZHEOpen the recordsJSON
Reject allNR-RN-01M78Z6BT3XJQQM3RDE2FCECR5Open the recordsJSON
Reject allNR-RN-01M78Z89RKA65XA48NBHCY55JKOpen the recordsJSON
Reject allNR-RN-01M78ZA6C6HHSC8JNVX4X80GTQOpen the recordsJSON
Accept allNR-RN-01M78Z6WJEPW9RTEC9W7MV253WOpen the recordsJSON
Accept allNR-RN-01M78Z8S5SBZBBRKR8W1RQH63VOpen the recordsJSON
Accept allNR-RN-01M78ZANS0BWBBKCZH029R94TPOpen the recordsJSON
GPC enabledNR-RN-01M78Z7BYZCH29A3ZCZP2A3GQFOpen the recordsJSON
GPC enabledNR-RN-01M78Z98NA6H9N1S9KQ896GCFJOpen the recordsJSON
GPC enabledNR-RN-01M78ZB54YHMFR8FVKGCX489MQOpen the recordsJSON

Limits

Limitations of this scan

What this scan does not cover. Read these before you use a number.

  1. Radar observed this site from one location on one date: Chrome (Chromium) 153 on linux from tr-workstation, scan started 2026-11-12. Another location, date, browser or visitor can see different requests.
  2. Counts are the median over the valid runs of each scenario, rounded up; a scenario without a valid run shows no numbers.
  3. The page hooks reported in 12 of 12 runs; an API whose hook was not installed cannot be reported as not observed, and workers are outside the hooks.
  4. Interaction probes typed made-up values into up to five fields of the entry page and never submitted them; password, payment, search, one-time-code, hidden, file and cross-origin-frame fields were skipped.
  5. Up to four extra same-site pages were loaded in the Before choice scenario; their requests are listed with each page and are not part of the scenario counts.
  6. The policy-page check compares organisation names of the editorial entity map with the policy page the scanner found; it says nothing about what a policy promises.
  7. Only the browser side is observed: what a server does with a request or a value is not observed.
  8. Organisation names and countries come from the editorial entity map: an unlisted party stays unknown and a country appears only with its cited source.
  9. Radar does not match requests against lists of advertising or tracking domains and does not instrument session recording, so the absence of a card says nothing about them.
  10. The views describe technical observations; they are not a legal assessment.